| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14232 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14232 |
| Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of \"Independent\" Directors | |
| Lauren Cohen; Andrea Frazzini; Christopher Malloy | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-14 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, micro-level data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the board of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong-buy/buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We find that appointed analysts' optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms' benefits are larger, and that appointing firms increase earnings management, and perform poorly, following these board appointments. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14232 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571901 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lauren Cohen,Andrea Frazzini,Christopher Malloy. Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of \"Independent\" Directors. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14232.pdf（218KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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