| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w14152
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 14152
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| An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications |
| Pablo T. Spiller
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| 发表日期 | 2008-08-15
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The fundamental feature of private contracting is its relational nature. When faced with unforeseen or unexpected circumstances, private parties, as long as the relation remains worthwhile, adjust their required performance without the need for costly renegotiation or formal recontracting. Public contracting, on the other hand, seems to be characterized by formalized, standardized, bureaucratic, rigid procedures. Common wisdom sees public contracts as generally more inflexible, requiring more frequent formal renegotiation, having a higher tendency to litigate, and providing weaker incentives. In sum, public contracts are perceived to be less "efficient." In this paper I develop a theory of public contracting that accommodates these stark differences between private and public contracting. The thrust of the paper is that these differences arise directly because of the different hazards present in public and purely private contracts, which directly impact the nature of the resulting contractual forms. A fundamental corollary of this result is that the perceived inefficiency of public or governmental contracting is simply the result of contractual adaptation to different inherent hazards, and as such is not directly remediable. Finally, I apply the main insights from the general framework developed here to understand the characteristics of concession contracts. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Industrial Organization
; Market Structure and Firm Performance
; Nonprofits
; Regulatory Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14152
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571906
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pablo T. Spiller. An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications. 2008.
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文件名：
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w14152.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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