| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14254 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14254 |
| When to Pollute, When to Abate? Intertemporal Permit Use in the Los Angeles NOx Market | |
| Stephen P. Holland; Michael Moore | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Intertemporal tradability allows an emissions market to reduce abatement costs. We study intertemporal trading of nitrogen oxides permits in the RECLAIM program in Southern California. A theoretical model captures the program's key intertemporal features: two overlapping permit cycles, two compliance cycles for facilities, and tradable permits. We characterize the competitive equilibrium; show that it is cost effective; and demonstrate the firms' incentive to delay abatement, i.e., to trade intertemporally. Using model extensions to explore market design issues, an arbitrage condition implies that the equilibrium is invariant to overlapping compliance cycles, but depends crucially on overlapping permit cycles. We empirically investigate intertemporal trading of permits using panel data on RECLAIM facilities for 1994-2006. Facilities undertake trading by using a considerable proportion of permits of the opposite cycle. We econometrically test two theoretical propositions -- delayed abatement and trading across cycles -- with a difference-in-differences estimator. The results neither contradict nor provide conclusive support of the theory. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14254 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/571928 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen P. Holland,Michael Moore. When to Pollute, When to Abate? Intertemporal Permit Use in the Los Angeles NOx Market. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14254.pdf（235KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
