全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w14331
来源ID	Working Paper 14331
	Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
	Phillip Leslie; Paul Oyer
发表日期	2008-09-10
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze the differences between companies owned by private equity (PE) investors and similar public companies. We document that PE-owned companies use much stronger incentives for their top executives and have substantially higher debt levels. However, we find little evidence that PE-owned firms outperform public firms in profitability or operational efficiency. We also show that the compensation and debt differences between PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short period (one to two years) after the PE-owned firm goes public. Our results raise questions about whether and how PE firms and the incentives they put in place create value.
主题	Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w14331
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572004
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Phillip Leslie,Paul Oyer. Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity. 2008.