| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14360 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14360 |
| Media versus Special Interests | |
| Alexander Dyck; David Moss; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; History ; Other History ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14360 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572034 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Dyck,David Moss,Luigi Zingales. Media versus Special Interests. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14360.pdf（221KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
