| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w14391
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 14391
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| Stabilizing Expectations under Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination |
| Stefano Eusepi; Bruce Preston
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| 发表日期 | 2008-10-08
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| 出版年 | 2008
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the constraints imposed on monetary and fiscal policy design by expectations formation. Households and firms learn about the policy regime using historical data. Regime uncertainty substantially narrows, relative to a rational expectations analysis of the model, the menu of policies consistent with expectations stabilization. There is greater need for policy coordination: the specific choice of monetary policy limits the set of fiscal policies consistent with macroeconomic stability --- and simple Taylor-type rules frequently lead to expectations-driven instability. In contrast, non-Ricardian fiscal policies combined with an interest rate peg promote stability. Resolving uncertainty about the prevailing monetary policy regime improves stabilization policy, enlarging the menu of policy options consistent with stability. However, there are limits to the benefits of communicating the monetary policy regime: the more heavily indebted the economy, the greater is the likelihood of expectations-driven instability. More generally, regardless of agents' knowledge of the policy regime, even when expectations are anchored in the long term, short-term dynamics display greater volatility than under rational expectations. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Monetary Policy
; Fiscal Policy
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14391
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572066
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Stefano Eusepi,Bruce Preston. Stabilizing Expectations under Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination. 2008.
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文件名：
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w14391.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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