| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14455 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14455 |
| Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance | |
| Randall D. Cebul; James B. Rebitzer; Lowell J. Taylor; Mark E. Votruba | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-10-30 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the role of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase the cost of insurance by enabling insurers to set price above marginal cost, and by creating incentives for inefficiently high levels of marketing. Frictions also lead to price dispersion for identical products and, as a consequence, to increases in the rate of insurance turnover. Our empirical analysis indicates that frictions increase prices enough to transfer 13.2% of consumer surplus from employer groups to insurers (approximately $34.4 billion in 1997), and increase employer group turnover by 64% for the average insurance policy. This heightened turnover reduces insurer incentives to invest in the future health of their policy holders. Our analysis also suggests that a publicly-financed insurance option might improve private insurance markets by reducing distortions induced by search frictions. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14455 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572130 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Randall D. Cebul,James B. Rebitzer,Lowell J. Taylor,et al. Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost and Quality of Health Insurance. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14455.pdf（315KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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