| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14502 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14502 |
| On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations | |
| Pascal Courty; Gerald R. Marschke | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium assortative matching takes place; more able physicians join occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk above a given threshold are not viable. The model offers an explanation for the persistence of distortions in the mix of health care services offered the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in medical specialization. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14502 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572177 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pascal Courty,Gerald R. Marschke. On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14502.pdf（232KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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