全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Term Length and Political Performance

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w14511
来源ID	Working Paper 14511
	Term Length and Political Performance
	Ernesto Dal Bó; Martín Rossi
发表日期	2008-11-21
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. We use a second experiment in the Argentine Senate to determine whether our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Our results suggest that the "accountability logic" is overcome by an "investment logic."
主题	Public Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w14511
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572186
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ernesto Dal Bó,Martín Rossi. Term Length and Political Performance. 2008.