| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14576 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14576 |
| Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA | |
| Edward J. Kane; Rosalind Bennett; Robert Oshinsky | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-18 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To realign supervisory and market incentives, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) adjusts two principal features of federal banking supervision. First, it requires regulators to examine insured institutions more frequently and makes them accountable for exercising their supervisory powers. Second, the Act empowers regulators to wind up the affairs of troubled institutions before their accounting net worth is exhausted. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14576 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572250 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward J. Kane,Rosalind Bennett,Robert Oshinsky. Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14576.pdf（202KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
