| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14618 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14618 |
| Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation | |
| Clayton Featherstone; Muriel Niederle | |
| 发表日期 | 2008-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2008 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is sometimes punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first criterion and is ambiguously ranked by the second. Our laboratory experiments confirm this. A new ex ante perspective, where preferences are private information, introduces new efficiency costs borne by strategy-proof mechanisms, like DA. In a symmetric environment, truth-telling can be an equilibrium under Boston, and Boston can first-order stochastically dominate DA in terms of efficiency, both in theory and in the laboratory. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14618 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572294 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Clayton Featherstone,Muriel Niederle. Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation. 2008. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14618.pdf（260KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
