| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14654 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14654 |
| Satisficing Contracts | |
| Patrick Bolton; Antoine Faure-Grimaud | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-01-15 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the sense that they face time-costs of deliberating current and future transactions. We show that equilibrium contracts may be incomplete and assign control rights: they may leave some enforceable future transactions unspecified and instead specify which agent has the right to decide these transactions. Control rights allow the controlling agent to defer time-consuming deliberations on those transactions to a later date, making her less inclined to prolong negotiations over an initial incomplete contract. Still, agents tend to resolve conflicts up-front by writing more complete initial contracts. A more complete contract can take the form of either a finer adaptation to future contingencies, or greater coarseness. Either way, conflicts among contracting agents tend to result in excessively complete contracts in the sense that the maximization of joint payoffs would result in less up-front deliberation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14654 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572328 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bolton,Antoine Faure-Grimaud. Satisficing Contracts. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14654.pdf（311KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
