| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14674 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14674 |
| Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics | |
| Jaap H. Abbring; Jeffrey R. Campbell | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-01-22 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, sequences of thresholds describe firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14674 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572350 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaap H. Abbring,Jeffrey R. Campbell. Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14674.pdf（440KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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