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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w14674
来源IDWorking Paper 14674
Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics
Jaap H. Abbring; Jeffrey R. Campbell
发表日期2009-01-22
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, sequences of thresholds describe firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure.
主题Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w14674
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572350
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GB/T 7714
Jaap H. Abbring,Jeffrey R. Campbell. Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics. 2009.
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