| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14702 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14702 |
| Government Transfers and Political Support | |
| Marco Manacorda; Edward Miguel; Andrea Vigorito | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-02-05 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 14 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. A calibration exercise indicates that these persistent impacts are consistent with a model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politicians' redistributive preferences. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14702 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Manacorda,Edward Miguel,Andrea Vigorito. Government Transfers and Political Support. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14702.pdf（252KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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