| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14703 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14703 |
| Disclosure by Politicians | |
| Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-02-05 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14703 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572379 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,et al. Disclosure by Politicians. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14703.pdf（615KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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