Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w14741 |
来源ID | Working Paper 14741 |
Earnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence From U.S. Law Firms | |
Luis Garicano; Thomas Hubbard | |
发表日期 | 2009-02-19 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s. Using evidence from confidential Census data on U.S. law offices on lawyers' organization and earnings, we study the extent to which the mechanism suggested by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), a scale of operations effect linking spans of control and earnings inequality, is responsible increases in inequality. We first show that earnings inequality among lawyers increased substantially between 1977 and 1992, and that the distribution of partner-associate ratios across offices changed in ways consistent with the hypothesis that coordination costs fell during this period. We then propose a "hierarchical production function" in which output is the product of skill and time and estimate its parameters, applying insights from the equilibrium assignment literature. We find that coordination costs fell broadly and steadily during this period, so that hiring one's first associate leveraged a partner's skill by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977. We find also that changes in lawyers' hierarchical organization account for about 2/3 of the increase in earnings inequality among lawyers in the upper tail, but a much smaller share of the increase in inequality between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers. These findings indicate that new organizational efficiencies potentially explain increases in inequality, especially among individuals toward the top of the earnings distribution. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14741 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572417 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luis Garicano,Thomas Hubbard. Earnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence From U.S. Law Firms. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w14741.pdf(327KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Luis Garicano]的文章 |
[Thomas Hubbard]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Luis Garicano]的文章 |
[Thomas Hubbard]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Luis Garicano]的文章 |
[Thomas Hubbard]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。