| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14752 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14752 |
| An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation | |
| Joshua Schwartzstein; Andrei Shleifer | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable activity. When social returns to innovation are higher than private returns, it may pay the society to generate some information ex ante about how risky firms are, and to impose safety standards based on that information. In some situations, compliance with such standards should entirely preempt tort liability; in others, it should merely reduce penalties. By reducing litigation risk, this type of regulation can raise welfare. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14752 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572428 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Schwartzstein,Andrei Shleifer. An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14752.pdf（468KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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