| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14765 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14765 |
| Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions | |
| Jeremy Bulow; Jonathan Levin; Paul Milgrom | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14765 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572441 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeremy Bulow,Jonathan Levin,Paul Milgrom. Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14765.pdf（427KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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