| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14799 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14799 |
| The Real Swing Voter's Curse | |
| James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-03-18 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached - swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political parties can use repression and violence to exclude voters from elections, they may optimally target the swing voters. This is because they anticipate that if they had to compete for the support of these voters, they would end up giving them a lot of policy favors. Hence in weakly institutionalized political environments swing voters are cursed rather than blessed. We illustrate the analysis with a discussion of recent political events in Zimbabwe. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14799 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572475 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. The Real Swing Voter's Curse. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14799.pdf（123KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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