全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w14855
来源ID	Working Paper 14855
	Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence
	Patrick Bajari; Gregory Lewis
发表日期	2009-04-08
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to complete the contract. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion times inflict a negative externality on commuters. Recently, highway departments have introduced innovative contracting methods based on scoring auctions that give contractors explicit time incentives. We characterize equilibrium bidding and efficient design of these contracts. We then gather an extensive data set of highway repair projects awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008 that includes both innovative and standard contracts. Comparing similar con- tracts in which the innovative design was and was not used, we show that the welfare gains to commuters from quicker completion substantially exceeded the increase in the winning bid. Having argued that the current policy is effective, we then develop a structural econometric model that endogenizes participation and bidding to examine counterfactual policies. Our estimates suggest that while the current policy raised com- muter surplus relative to the contractor's costs by $359M (6.8% of the total contract value), the optimal policy would raise it by $1.52B (29%).
主题	Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w14855
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572530
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Patrick Bajari,Gregory Lewis. Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence. 2009.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w14855.pdf（296KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览