| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14856 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14856 |
| A Theory of Outsourcing and Wage Decline | |
| Thomas J. Holmes; Julia Thornton Snider | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-08 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of outsourcing in which there is market power in one factor market (labor) and no market power in a second factor market (capital). There are two intermediate goods: one labor-intensive and the other capital-intensive. We show there is always outsourcing in the market allocation when a friction limiting outsourcing is not too big. The key factor underlying the result is that labor demand is more elastic, the greater the labor share. Integrated plants pay higher wages than the specialist producers of labor-intensive intermediates. We derive conditions under which there are multiple equilibria that vary in the degree of outsourcing. Across these equilibria, wages are lower the greater the degree of outsourcing. Wages fall when outsourcing increases in response to a decline in the outsourcing friction. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14856 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572531 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas J. Holmes,Julia Thornton Snider. A Theory of Outsourcing and Wage Decline. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14856.pdf（415KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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