全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w14857
来源ID	Working Paper 14857
	Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities
	Stephen Coate; Brian Knight
发表日期	2009-04-08
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	There are two main forms of government in U.S. cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council, but that either form of government could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent with the co-existence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both a cross-sectional analysis and a panel analysis of changes in government form.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w14857
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572532
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Stephen Coate,Brian Knight. Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities. 2009.