| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14877 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14877 |
| Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries? | |
| Xavier Giroud; Holger M. Mueller | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws' passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a "quiet-life" hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws' passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14877 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572553 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Giroud,Holger M. Mueller. Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14877.pdf（323KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
