| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14881 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14881 |
| Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital | |
| Richard A. Lambert; Christian Leuz; Robert E. Verrecchia | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The consequences of information differences across investors in capital markets are still much debated. This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors and the cost of capital, and makes three points. First, in models of perfect competition, information differences across investors affect a firm's cost of capital through investors' average information precision, and not information asymmetry per se. Second, the average precision effect of information that is heterogeneously distributed across investors is unlikely to diversify away when there exist many firms whose cash flows covary. Thus, better disclosure can reduce a firm's cost of capital. Third, the precision effect does not give rise to a separate information-risk factor. These points are important to empirical research in accounting and finance, as well as to regulators who debate future disclosure requirements and the consequences of prior requirements such as Regulation Fair Disclosure. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14881 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572557 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard A. Lambert,Christian Leuz,Robert E. Verrecchia. Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14881.pdf（350KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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