| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14906 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14906 |
| Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance | |
| Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question. In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil's municipal governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our main findings show that higher wages increases political competition and improves the quality of legislators, as measured by education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. In addition to this positive selection, we find that wages also affect politicians' performance, which is consistent with a behavioral response to a higher value of holding office. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14906 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572581 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan. Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14906.pdf（1002KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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