| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14921 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14921 |
| Experts and Their Records | |
| Alexander Frankel; Michael Schwarz | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider an environment where long-lived experts repeatedly interact with short-lived customers. In periods when an expert is hired, she chooses between providing a profitable major treatment or a less profitable minor treatment. The expert has private information about which treatment best serves the customer, but has no direct incentive to act in the customer's interest. Customers can observe the past record of each expert's actions, but never learn which actions would have been appropriate. We find that there exists an equilibrium in which experts always play truthfully and choose the customer's preferred treatment. The expert is rewarded for choosing the less profitable action with future business: customers return to an expert with high probability if the previous treatment was minor, and low probability if it was major. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14921 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572597 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Frankel,Michael Schwarz. Experts and Their Records. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14921.pdf（698KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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