全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w14922
来源ID	Working Paper 14922
	Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
	Robin S. Lee; Michael Schwarz
发表日期	2009-04-23
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion, and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: i.e., if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w14922
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572598
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Robin S. Lee,Michael Schwarz. Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets. 2009.