| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14923 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14923 |
| The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta | |
| Chang-Tai Hsieh; Edward Miguel; Daniel Ortega; Francisco Rodriguez | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP. |
| 主题 | History ; Macroeconomic History ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14923 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572599 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chang-Tai Hsieh,Edward Miguel,Daniel Ortega,et al. The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14923.pdf（396KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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