| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14925 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14925 |
| Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze | |
| Douglas W. Diamond; Raghuram G. Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Is there any need to "clean" up a banking system in the midst of a crisis, by closing or recapitalizing weak banks and taking bad assets off bank balance sheets, or can one wait till the crisis is over? We argue that an "overhang" of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets soon can reduce the current price of illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them. Anticipating a potential future fire sale, cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash, which also reduces their incentive to lock up money in term loans. The potential for a worse fire sale than necessary, as well as the associated decline in credit origination, could make the crisis worse, which is one reason it may make sense to clean up the system even in the midst of the crisis. We discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system, and the associated costs and benefits. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14925 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572601 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas W. Diamond,Raghuram G. Rajan. Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14925.pdf（206KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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