| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14937 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14937 |
| Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments | |
| Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14937 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572613 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan. Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14937.pdf（274KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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