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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w14940 |
来源ID | Working Paper 14940 |
Scarcity of Ideas and R&D Options: Use it, Lose it or Bank it | |
Nisvan Erkal; Suzanne Scotchmer | |
发表日期 | 2009-05-07 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We investigate rewards to R&D in a model where substitute ideas for innovation arrive to random recipients at random times. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We characterize the welfare-maximizing reward structure when the social planner learns over time about the arrival rate of ideas, and when private recipients of ideas can bank their ideas for future use. We argue that private incentives to create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are scarce." |
主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14940 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572616 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nisvan Erkal,Suzanne Scotchmer. Scarcity of Ideas and R&D Options: Use it, Lose it or Bank it. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w14940.pdf(280KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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