| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w14943 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 14943 |
| Unstable Banking | |
| Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-05-07 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in them, or hold cash. They can also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. We embed such banks in a stylized financial market, in which securitized loans may be mispriced, and investigate how banks allocate limited capital among the various activities, as well as how they choose their capital structure. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory explains the cyclical behavior of credit and investment, but also accounts for the fundamental instability of banks operating in financial markets, especially when banks use leverage. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14943 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572619 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny. Unstable Banking. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w14943.pdf（153KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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