| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w14947
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 14947
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| A Model of Casino Gambling |
| Nicholas C. Barberis
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| 发表日期 | 2009-05-07
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| 出版年 | 2009
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling, one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior. First, we demonstrate that, for a wide range of preference parameter values, a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino only offers bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment he enters a casino, the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy; but after he starts playing, he wants to switch to a different strategy. The model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior: how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Behavioral Economics
; Economics of Information
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14947
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572623
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Nicholas C. Barberis. A Model of Casino Gambling. 2009.
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文件名：
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w14947.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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