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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w14972 |
来源ID | Working Paper 14972 |
Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets | |
Bruce I. Carlin; Simon Gervais | |
发表日期 | 2009-05-21 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Given the importance of sound advice in retail financial markets and the fact that financial institutions outsource their advice services, what legal rules maximize social welfare in the market? We address this question by posing a theoretical model of retail markets in which a firm and a broker face a bilateral hidden action problem when they service clients in the market. All participants in the market are rational, and prices are set based on consistent beliefs about equilibrium actions of the firm and the broker. We characterize the optimal law within our modeling context, and derive how the legal system splits the blame between parties to the transaction. We also analyze how complexity in assessing clients and conflicts of interest affect the law. Since these markets are large, the implications of the analysis have great welfare import. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Law and Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w14972 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572648 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruce I. Carlin,Simon Gervais. Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets. 2009. |
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w14972.pdf(280KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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