| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15067 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15067 |
| China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption | |
| Hongbin Cai; J. Vernon Henderson; Qinghua Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-11 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003--2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are "cold", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Country Studies ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Regional Economics ; Real Estate |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15067 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572743 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hongbin Cai,J. Vernon Henderson,Qinghua Zhang. China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15067.pdf（439KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
