| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15136 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15136 |
| Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket? | |
| Michael Schwarz; Sergei Severinov | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-09 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we study "investment tournaments," a class of decision problems that involve gradual allocation of investment among several alternatives whose values are subject to exogenous shocks. The decision-maker's payoff is determined by the final values of the alternatives. An important example of career tournaments motivating our research is the career choice problem, since a person choosing a career often starts by investing in learning several professions. We show that in a broad range of cases it is optimal for the decision-maker in each time period to allocate all resources to the most promising alternative. We also show that in tournaments for a promotion the agents would rationally put forth a higher effort in an early stage of the tournament in a bid to capture a larger share of employer's investment, such as mentoring. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15136 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572811 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Schwarz,Sergei Severinov. Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15136.pdf（276KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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