| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15139 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15139 |
| When Does Libertarian Paternalism Work? | |
| Bruce Ian Carlin; Simon Gervais; Gustavo Manso | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-09 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theoretical model to study the effects of libertarian paternalism on knowledge acquisition and social learning. Individuals in our model are permitted to appreciate and use the information content in the default options set by the government. We show that in some settings libertarian paternalism may decrease welfare because default options slow information aggregation in the market. We also analyze what happens when the government acquires imprecise information about individuals, and characterize its incentives to avoid full disclosure of its information to the market, even when it has perfect information. Finally, we consider a market in which individuals can sell their information to others and show that the presence of default options causes the quality of advice to decrease, which may lower social welfare. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15139 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572814 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruce Ian Carlin,Simon Gervais,Gustavo Manso. When Does Libertarian Paternalism Work?. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15139.pdf（204KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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