全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w15140
来源ID	Working Paper 15140
	Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis
	Marc T. Law; Zeynep K. Hansen
发表日期	2009-07-09
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of medical licensing boards and the frequency with which boards discipline physicians. Specifically, we take advantage of variation in the structure of medical licensing boards between 1993 and 2003 to determine the effect of organizational and budgetary independence, public oversight, and resource constraints on rates of physician discipline. We find that larger licensing boards, boards with more staff, and boards that are organizationally independent from state government discipline doctors more frequently. Public oversight and political control over board budgets do not appear to influence the extent to which medical licensing boards discipline doctors. These findings are broadly consistent with theories of regulatory behavior that emphasize the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for effective regulatory enforcement.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w15140
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572815
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marc T. Law,Zeynep K. Hansen. Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis. 2009.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w15140.pdf（196KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览