| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15159 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15159 |
| Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization | |
| Manuel Adelino; Kristopher Gerardi; Paul S. Willen | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15159 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572835 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Adelino,Kristopher Gerardi,Paul S. Willen. Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15159.pdf（277KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
