| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15165 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15165 |
| Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts | |
| John B. Donaldson; Natalia Gershun; Marc P. Giannoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. Delegation gives rise to a generic conflict of interest mediated by a convex (option-like) compensation contract which is able to align the interests of managers and their shareholders. With such a compensation contract, a given increase in the firm's output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager's income. We find that incentive contracts of this form can easily result in an indeterminate general equilibrium, with business cycles driven by self-fulfilling fluctuations in the manager's expectations. These expectations are unrelated to fundamentals. Arbitrarily large fluctuations in macroeconomic variables may possibly result. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15165 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572841 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John B. Donaldson,Natalia Gershun,Marc P. Giannoni. Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15165.pdf（470KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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