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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w15167 |
来源ID | Working Paper 15167 |
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem | |
Philippe Aghion; Drew Fudenberg; Richard T. Holden | |
发表日期 | 2009-07-16 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15167 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572843 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Aghion,Drew Fudenberg,Richard T. Holden. Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w15167.pdf(264KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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