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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w15167
来源IDWorking Paper 15167
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
Philippe Aghion; Drew Fudenberg; Richard T. Holden
发表日期2009-07-16
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Households and Firms ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w15167
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572843
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GB/T 7714
Philippe Aghion,Drew Fudenberg,Richard T. Holden. Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem. 2009.
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