| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15192 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15192 |
| A Theory of Firm Decline | |
| Gian Luca Clementi; Thomas F. Cooley; Sonia Di Giannatale | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the problem of an investor who buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15192 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572868 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gian Luca Clementi,Thomas F. Cooley,Sonia Di Giannatale. A Theory of Firm Decline. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15192.pdf（6381KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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