| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15212 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15212 |
| Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis | |
| Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentives and share ownership before the crisis and whether CEOs reduced their equity stakes in their banks in anticipation of the crisis. There is no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed better during the crisis and some evidence that these banks actually performed worse both in terms of stock returns and in terms of accounting return on equity. Further, option compensation did not have an adverse impact on bank performance during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis; further, there is no evidence that they hedged their equity exposure. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses as a result of the crisis. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15212 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572888 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,René M. Stulz. Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15212.pdf（210KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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