| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15214 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15214 |
| Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery | |
| David M. Cutler; Robert S. Huckman; Jonathan T. Kolstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-13 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Prior studies suggest that, with elastically supplied inputs, free entry may lead to an inefficiently high number of firms in equilibrium. Under input scarcity, however, the welfare loss from free entry is reduced. Further, free entry may increase use of high-quality inputs, as oligopolistic firms underuse these inputs when entry is constrained. We assess these predictions by examining how the 1996 repeal of certificate-of-need (CON) legislation in Pennsylvania affected the market for cardiac surgery in the state. We show that entry led to a redistribution of surgeries to higher-quality surgeons and that this entry was approximately welfare neutral. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15214 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/572890 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David M. Cutler,Robert S. Huckman,Jonathan T. Kolstad. Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15214.pdf（255KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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