| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15326 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15326 |
| Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease | |
| Emily Oster; Ira Shoulson; Kimberly Quaid; E. Ray Dorsey | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-09-04 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets; this selection could impact the viability of these markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. We use these estimates to make predictions about the future of this market as genetic information increases. We argue that even relatively limited increases in genetic information may threaten the viability of private long-term care insurance. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15326 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573001 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emily Oster,Ira Shoulson,Kimberly Quaid,et al. Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15326.pdf（318KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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