| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15371 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15371 |
| The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums | |
| Ronen Avraham; Leemore S. Dafny; Max M. Schanzenbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-09-24 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms. Using a dataset of healthplans representing over 10 million Americans annually between 1998 and 2006, we find that caps on non-economic damages, collateral source reform, and joint and several liability reform reduce premiums by 1 to 2 percent each. These reductions are concentrated in PPOs rather than HMOs, suggesting that can HMOs can reduce "defensive" healthcare costs even absent tort reform. The results are the first direct evidence that tort reform reduces healthcare costs in aggregate; prior research has focused on particular medical conditions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15371 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573046 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ronen Avraham,Leemore S. Dafny,Max M. Schanzenbach. The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15371.pdf（365KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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