| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15378 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15378 |
| Persistence of Civil Wars | |
| Daron Acemoglu; Davide Ticchi; Andrea Vindigni | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-09-24 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; History ; Macroeconomic History ; Other History ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15378 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573053 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Davide Ticchi,Andrea Vindigni. Persistence of Civil Wars. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15378.pdf（175KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
