| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15392 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15392 |
| Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D | |
| Florian Heiss; Daniel McFadden; Joachim Winter | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program as a bellwether for designs of private, non-mandatory health insurance markets that control adverse selection and assure adequate access and coverage. We model Part D enrollment and plan choice assuming a discrete dynamic decision process that maximizes life-cycle expected utility, and perform counterfactual policy simulations of the effect of market design on participation and plan viability. Our model correctly predicts high Part D enrollment rates among the currently healthy, but also strong adverse selection in choice of level of coverage. We analyze alternative designs that preserve plan variety. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15392 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573068 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Heiss,Daniel McFadden,Joachim Winter. Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15392.pdf（780KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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