| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15449 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15449 |
| Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation | |
| Martijn Cremers; Roberta Romano | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-10-22 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation adopted by the SEC in 2003, using a paired sample of management proposals on executive equity incentive compensation plans submitted before and after the rule change. While voting support for management has decreased over time, we find no evidence that mutual funds' support for management declined after the rule change, as expected by advocates of disclosure. In fact, we find evidence of increased support for management by mutual funds after the change. There is some evidence that firms sponsoring such proposals both before and after the rule change differ from those sponsoring a proposal only before the change. For example, firms are more likely to sponsor a proposal both before and after the rule change if they have higher mutual fund ownership. Such endogeneity could partly explain our findings of increased support after the rule. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15449 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573125 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martijn Cremers,Roberta Romano. Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15449.pdf（194KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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