全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-and-Trade Markets for CO2

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w15495
来源ID	Working Paper 15495
	Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-and-Trade Markets for CO2
	James B. Bushnell; Yihsu Chen
发表日期	2009-11-12
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	The allocation of emissions allowances is among the most contentious elements of the design of cap-and-trade systems. In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the US western electricity market to assess the potential impacts of various allocation proposals. Several proposals involve the "updating'' of permit allocation, where the allocation is tied to the ongoing output, or input use, of plants. These allocation proposals are designed with the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigating leakage, and of mitigating costs to high-emissions firms. However, some forms of updating can also inflate permit prices, thereby limiting the benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms. Rather than mitigating the impact on high carbon producers, the net operating profit of such firms can actually be lower under input-based updating than under auctioning. This is due to the fact that product prices (and therefore revenues) are lower under input-based updating, but overall compliance costs are relatively comparable between auctioning and input-based updating. In this way, the anticipated benefits from allocation updating are reduced and further distortions are introduced into the trading system.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w15495
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573171
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	James B. Bushnell,Yihsu Chen. Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-and-Trade Markets for CO2. 2009.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w15495.pdf（273KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览